A Response to Kurt Weyland
by Jeffrey Hallock
Near the end of the January 9, 2024, episode of Democracy Paradox, host Justin Kempf probed a recurrent theme in his conversations with Dr. Kurt Weyland—that overreacting to anti-democratic threats can, paradoxically, further democratic erosion. Kempf asked, “Why is it so dangerous to overreact to democratic threats?” In response, Weyland advanced an argument centered on the idea that proper countermeasures to populists “have a good sense of [a state’s] institutional framework” to avoid fueling polarization used to increase populists’ appeal.
While Weyland convincingly argues that strong institutions can prove resilient in the face of elected populists’ authoritarian aspirations, the institutional argument becomes stretched when examining the “proper ways” to confront populists. Weyland’s examples of overreaction largely focused on the U.S. and how not to confront Trump. Disagreeing with both the premise and examples, I argue in favor of a proactive defense of democracy that positions institutions as a backstop against anti-democratic aims, rather than the primary line of defense.
Conveying the Stakes
First, confronting anti-democratic populists requires making the stakes of their aims and unpopular policy proposalssalient to the general population. Arguments in favor of democracy are not self-executing, but pro-democracy forces can draw sharp contrasts between the benefits of free and open societies—while also acknowledging shortcomings—and the risks of illiberalism.
Weyland advises against risking further polarization by jumping on Trump’s statement that he would not be a dictator, “Except on day one.” This point contains three assumptions. First, that confronting populists’ “jokes” drives polarization, rather than polarization being part of a longer trend. Second, that more “precise” alternative actions would not similarly result in bad-faith efforts by populists to criticize opponents and gin up support. And, third, that ignoring a consequential statement provides a more desirable outcome than addressing it.
Opportunistic populists use rhetoric and advance ideas that are often contradictory or hard to pin down, but opportunities to go on the offensive exist. Distributing an AI-generated video of a Javier Milei-induced hellscape was not a winning tactic. However, connecting anti-democratic rhetoric about being a ‘one-day-dictator’ to a candidate who—when last in office—launched an autogolpe that sought to disenfranchise more than 81 million Americans provides an opportunity to make the stakes of the election salient. The events of January 6 have been reframed and diminishedby Trump and his supporters. Ignoring a statement of dictatorial intent only creates more space for revisionism. Affirmative democratic arguments can draw on populists’ gaffes or admissions to sharpen the distinction between those who want to expand citizens’ rights and the real threat of those who would limit them.
Democracy by the People
Second, mass protests are an important form of civic participation and coalition building that can redefine and expand political debates. As seen in Guatemala at the end of 2023 through the start of 2024, indigenous groups successfullyspearheaded a pro-democracy movement in support of president-elect Bernardo Arévalo after corrupt forces threatened his electoral victory. Despite acknowledging empirical support for related protests in his conversation with Kempf, Weyland cautions against mass mobilization in the U.S. in favor of “conventional participation, elections, candidates.” He says that “ten people who smash windows” during an otherwise peaceful protest would give Trump a pretext to undermine the effort. Similar to an earlier counterargument, this premise rests on the idea that populists require a pretext to denigrate opposition and drive partisan support. This position also regards polarization as a negative, unidirectional phenomenon predominantly favoring populists. However, under certain conditions, “polarization can boost popular mobilization and sustain the commitment of activists over time.”
Non-violent, civic mobilization can influence electoral outcomes by shifting how voters assess candidates. Across Germany, pro-democracy groups organized massive protests in early 2024 to make an affirmative case in support of democracy and to rebuke rising illiberalism. While protest momentum is never assured and mass mobilization follows, rather than replaces, political and civic organizing, pro-democracy movements in the U.S. should take lessons from Germany as well as its recent past. The day after Trump’s 2017 inauguration, mass demonstrations across the country revealed a widespread desire to contest the new president. Yet, in the most important way, the enthusiasm was several months too late. Trump’s November 2016 victory was the first step in his long march to co-opt the Republican party, undermining one of the institutional obstacles Weyland has considered as a safeguard against Trump’s illiberalism.
Conventional participation, namely voting, remains the mechanism that determines democratic elections. While protesting in a polarized environment represents real risks, investing time, energy, and resources into civic organizingand mobilization in support of democracy before a consequential election can help build a winning coalition. Engaged political participation represents an effort to cultivate democracy with a demos.
Will the Institutions Hold?
Finally, the impetus for a proactive defense of democracy in the U.S. increases when considering Trump’s public contempt for democratic institutions. Of top concern is that Trump is not simply espousing anti-democratic rhetoric, but that he has a vast apparatus supporting his bid to remake the state. Organized by the Heritage Foundation, the Trump-supported “Project 2025” aims to overhaul the federal bureaucracy. In particular, Trump’s proposal to use Schedule F to create a new class of political appointees and purge the fictitious “deep state” is not simply a threat to undermine a large segment of the U.S.’ institutional framework. Rather, it is a promise to see through to completion an executive orderdecreed, but unrealized, at the end of his term.
Weyland makes a compelling case for institutions serving as a bulwark against populists. In the U.S., institutional guardrails mostly held during Trump’s presidential term—even as he was able to flagrantly corrupt aspects of the presidency and install federal judges who have demonstrated a preference for restricting, rather than expanding, citizens’ rights. During a second term, U.S. institutions are not assured to withstand pressure from a more “focused and lethal” assault. Defeating populists requires, in part, a proactive defense of democracy that focuses on the stakes of the election and expands citizen engagement in the democratic process. Institutions may hold, but pro-democratic forces can take active measures to limit the risk of stress tests being carried out.
About the Author
Jeffrey is a PhD candidate at American University’s School of International Service. His dissertation research examines national-level anti-corruption reform efforts. He is interested in the politics of anti-corruption, especially how civic mobilization and international actors support anti-corruption campaigns.
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